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CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Consitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7

4

Rule 65 B(e), U.R.C.P.

4
2

Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953), since the case arisesfromthe denial of
Appellant's petition for relief challenging the decision of the Board of Pardons and
Parole.

Issues on Appeal/Standard of Review
Since the ruling of the District Court was upon motion to dismiss Appellant's
petition for extraordinary relief, review as to all issues shall be without deference to
the trial court's conclusions of law, but review them for correctness. Termiinde v.
Cook, 786P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990); Rowlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 959 (Utah
App. 1994).
The issues are:
1. Is petitioner entitled to an immediate rehearing before the Board of
Pardons and Parole because of deprivation of his due processrightsat the original
hearing? The due process rights Petitioner asserts include the lack of assistance of
3

counsel at the hearing, the right to cross examine witnesses, call witnesses and
present evidence.
2. Should the petitioner be entitled to the rights provided for in Neel v.
Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994)?

Constitutional Provisions and Applicable Rules
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Rule 65B(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests
are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may
petition the court for relief
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A)
where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is
entitled.
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(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the
court may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a
hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court,
administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as
respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with
the terms of Rule 65 A.
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are
judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority.
Statement of the Case
Appellant brought a petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B(e)
U.R.C.P.
seeking a rehearing of his initial hearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole
(which occurred September 1, 1993). The basis for the relief requested was
petitioner's lack of access to the files examined by the Board and petitioner was not
afforded the right of cross examination of witnesses or the right to call witnesses.
Further the District Court found he was not entitled to the rights provided for in
Neel, id.
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Facts
This matter was presented and decided upon motion for dismissal filed by
respondent. The facts, as shown by the pleading, are as follows:
1.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced as a result of a guilty plea

originally December 18, 1992, with the District Court entering a corrected judgment
and sentence February 19, 1993 (three counts).
2.

Petitioner's initial hearing (the only hearing to date) before the Board of

Pardons and Parole occurred September 1, 1993, at which time the Board did not fix
a parole date but rescheduled a hearing for September, 1997.
3.

In the September, 1993 hearing, petitioner was not afforded the right of

representation of counsel nor had he had counsel assist in preparation. He was not
afforded the right of cross examination of witnesses or the right to call witnesses.

6

Summary of Argument
The fixing of parole by the Board of Pardons and Parole is a sentencing
function. Because of this sentencing function, Petitioner should be afforded his due
process rights under Section 7, Article 1 of the Constitution of Utah.
These due process rights should include right to counsel, for preparation and
participation at the hearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole, the right to call
witnesses, and the right of cross examination. Because petitioner was not afforded
theserights,a rehearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole should be ordered
with petitioner being afforded these rights and also the right of examination of his
file sufficiently in advance of the hearing to adequately prepare.
Argument
1.

Due Process
A.

Right to Counsel

A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at sentencing. Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254,19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d
839 (Utah 1972);
7

McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 4, 89 S.Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2, 4 (1968); United
States v. Pughese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1986).
In Knenhert v. Turner, this Court discussed the importance of an attorney at
sentencing:
The foregoing indicates the necessity of the presence of
counsel at the time of sentencing; so that there is a real
opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation of
the offense or in explanation of the offense or in
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to
correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's
past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its
administration and enforcement of penal laws.
(footnote omitted).
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized:
[T]he necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the
facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances
and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to
present his case as to sentence is apparent.
McConnel v. Rhay, 393 U.S. at 4, quotingMempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. at 135.
For the same reasons, counsel is of critical importance to an inmate appearing
before the Board for a parole grant hearing as this court recognized in Foote v. Utah
Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, the Board "performs a function analogous to that
8

of a trial judge in jurisdictions that have a determinate sentencing scheme." In order
to effectively present his case to the Board when it performs this analogous fiinction,
an inmate requires assistance of counsel.
The right to counsel at parole hearings includes the right to effective
assistance of counsel, and court appointed counsel for indigent inmates. See State
v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah App. 1987), tiling Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796-7, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (indignant defendant
has right to court appointed counsel).
Although the current policies of the Board afford an inmate a right to an
attorney at Parole revocation hearings, inmates are not afforded the right to counsel
during parole grant hearings. Without an attorney, an inmate has little chance of
effectively presenting his case to the Board. The policy of the board in denying
inmates a right to counsel at parole hearings violates due process under Article I,
Section 7, Constitution of Utah.
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B.

Right of Confrontation.

In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-9, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13
L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), the Court stated:
The primary object of the [confrontation clause] was to
prevent depositions of ex parte affidavits... [from being
used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination
of the witness and cross-examination in which the accused
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.
Therightto confrontation is a fundamental aspect of due process which "has
been placed on a par with the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard and the
right to counsel." Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1251 (modified. 706 F.2d
311 (1 lth Cir.)), cert- denied, 464 U.S. 1002, 104 S.Ct. 508, 78 L.Ed.2d 697
(1983), citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-5, 93 S.Ct. 1038,1045,
35L.Ed.2d297(1973).

10

Although the United States Supreme Court has not held that the right to
confrontation applies to sentencing, a number of courts have recognized that the
right to confrontation applies to the penalty phase of a capital trial. See, e.g.,
Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1986); Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d
1227; Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1511 (11th Cir. \9S9); Lanier v. State, 533
So.2d 473, 488-9 (Miss. 1988); Beltran v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1987). See also, State v. Glenn, 504 N.E.2d 701, 710 (Ohio 1986).
The role of confrontation in a non-capital sentencing is less clear, but the
need for accuracy and reliability would suggest that, at least in some situations, due
process requires that an inmate be given the opportunity to confront the witnesses
against him.
In Lipsky, this court indicated that
"the trial court may receive information concerning the
defendant in the form of a presentence report without the
author of the report necessarily personally appearing and
testifying in open court...."
Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244. However, "[i]f the defendant thinks the report inaccurate,
he should then have the opportunity to bring such inaccuracies to the court's
11

attention." It seems that where a defendant challenges the accuracy of a report, his
ability to confront the witnesses becomes of paramount importance. See United
States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 121 (D.C. 1976); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d
707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978); Howell, id at 118.
The right to confrontation should apply to any witness who appears before the
Board of who gives evidence. Utah Code Ann. Section 77-27-9(3) gives the Board
the power to "issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses...." Unlike
sentencing proceedings, victims are actively courted for their input. Fairness
requires that inmates be given the opportunity to confront such witnesses.
The importance of accuracy and reliability at Board hearings suggests that
due process requires that inmates have a right to confront witnesses against them
whenever the Board reviews information the accuracy of which the inmate
challenges.
2.

The District Court erred in determining that Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d

1015 (Utah 1994) was not applicable in establishing due process rights in this case.
"For the following reasons, the Court concludes Petitioner's claims fall outside the
12

protections given in both Neel and Labrum v. Utah Slate Board of Pardons^ 870
P.2d 902 (Utah 1993):" See the second paragraph of the Conclusions of Law of the
final orderfromwhich this appeal has been taken.
No claim is made that the petitioner has the right to assert rights under
Labrum since this case was not pending when the decision was rendered. However,
this case was pending before the District Court on December 7, 1994, when Neel,
id, was decided. The District Court concluded that the petitioner would receive no
rights, benefits or protectionsfromthe Neel holding, apparently since Neel was the
product of a parole revocation as opposed to an original parole hearing. This is
contrary to the holding in Neel. Specifically, "This rationale guides our decision in
the present case. We hold that an inmate is entitled to access psychological records
to be considered by the Board in hearings at which the inmates released date may be
fixed or extended." Neel, id at 1103. The Supreme Court speaks specifically
whether to make its' ailing retroactive about the impact of reopening "every parole
hearing at which it established an inmates release date". Neel id at 1105. It did not
limit its1 remarks to hearings following parole revocations. Further, it indicated
13

"...accordingly, today's decision applies only to those parole grant hearings held on
or after the date of this decision. We extend the benefits of this decision to David
Neel and to any inmate who currently has a similar claim pending in the District
Court or on appeal before this Court or the Court of Appeals." id at 1105. This case
was pending in the District Court on the date of the Neel decision, December 7,
1994. Petitioner should have been afforded all rights contained therein, which was
specifically not adopted by the District Court.
Conclusion
Petitioner should have been afforded the additional due process rights at the
initial hearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole, including the right of counsel
in the preparation and participation in the hearing, the rights relating to confrontation
including cross-examination, calling witnesses and introducing evidence.
Additionally, Petitioner should have had the rights provided in Neel id which
specifically were denied by the District Court in reaching its decision.
The judgment below must be reversed.
No addendum is necessary.
14
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